The interest of official Brussels, Berlin and London is to demonstrate at all costs that BiH is institutionally capable of resolving the current political crisis, in order to present this as an argument for opening negotiation chapters, said Professor Aleksandar Vranješ.
He noted that, if the crisis persists, however, BiH will not only demonstrate incompetence but will also call its candidate status into question—undermining plans for establishing a new model of foreign supervision in BiH.
Vranješ questioned whether London, Berlin, and Brussels still see BiH as a future EU member or whether they are simply seeking a modality to establish a new form of their own supervision through EU integration—without the involvement of the UN Security Council, the US, Russia, or China—which could conditionally be termed “Brussels supervision”.
Professor Vranješ’s op-ed is presented in full by SRNA:
The United Nations Security Council has recently addressed BiH three times—twice in closed consultations and once through a joint statement by all member states.
Based on what has been made public, it is evident that Christian Schmidt and his neocolonial administration in BiH are losing support from the United States. The UK and France continue to insist on the existence of the OHR at the UN, and coupled with the domestic support Schmidt enjoys, it is clear who still backs this foreign neocolonial rule in BiH.
Schmidt recently stated that the OHR will close only once BiH becomes a full EU member—meaning, effectively, never. This raises the question: do London, Berlin, and Brussels genuinely see BiH as a future EU member, or are they using EU integration as a cover for a new form of supervision—absent the Security Council, the US, Russia, and China—what could be labeled “Brussels supervision”.
This would enable a new model of imposition and reconfiguration of BiH through EU reforms, orchestrated by the trio—London, Brussels, and Berlin. Testing this hypothesis against several observable facts produces an interesting scenario.
The EU insists on selective rule of law in BiH. According to this approach, the so-called high representative can interfere in the judiciary for political purposes—only if the targets are leaders from Republika Srpska—who are then expected to accept these politically driven processes as rule of law.
In other words, the fabricated verdict against Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik must be respected, and RS leaders should be prosecuted under Schmidt’s new criminal offense: “attack on the constitutional order”.
In its 2019 Opinion on BiH’s progress, the European Commission condemned the use of so-called “Bonn powers”. Today, these dictatorial powers are not only respected, but their application is being framed as a precondition for further EU progress.
This is done implicitly—by avoiding context, omitting any mention of Schmidt’s impositions and political interventions, and reducing a complex political situation to secessionism and rule of law violations.
Germany went a step further. In a reply by the federal government to parliamentary questions from AfD, it was stated that Schmidt has improved the rule of law in BiH.
To any objective observer, it is clear that Western supervision has turned BiH into a colony—with no true rule of law or democratic achievements, which the London-Berlin-Brussels trio claims to champion.
The goal of Brussels, Berlin, and London is to showcase BiH’s institutional capacity to handle the political crisis, to pave the way for opening negotiation chapters. Should the crisis persist, not only will BiH appear incapable, but its candidate status could be jeopardized—threatening the plan for a new model of foreign supervision in BiH.
To prevent this, the trio—Berlin, London, and Brussels—have become actively involved in reconfiguring the state-level government, aiming to build a new pro-European coalition for the new “Brussels supervision”.
Bosniak parties currently in power needed little convincing. Disappointed by the US’s current stance toward BiH, they are looking to London, Berlin, and Brussels—who assure them that they are the backbone of future centralization of BiH via EU reforms, which would continue the erosion of Republika Srpska’s powers in favor of the central government.
The opposition from Republika Srpska is expected to cooperate on the EU path and distance itself from Dodik’s sovereignty-focused politics, thus qualifying for participation in state-level governance.
Both the ruling Bosniak parties and the RS opposition see the next twelve months as critical for their political survival, rushing to form a new coalition.
The main obstacle to this plan has been the position of HDZ and Dragan Čović. Despite following the Brussels-Zagreb-Mostar line, experience has taught them that participation must be tangibly rewarded—with amendments to the Election Law. This remains a serious sticking point in the plan.
Although Bosniak “Troika” representatives publicly support fair representation of all three constituent peoples, they also know that supporting such reforms could cost them political legitimacy among Bosniaks.
Even if Berlin, Brussels, and London promise to back the Election Law reform – including limiting foreign judges in the Constitutional Court – Čović has shown no willingness to make concessions on promises. Only when the new law secures legitimate Croatian representation would HDZ consider aligning flags again within the Federation.
The RS opposition – who come at the lowest cost in coalition negotiations – would be satisfied simply to see Dodik out of power.
Their attempts to condition coalition talks with demands for electoral integrity, digitalization of the voting process, faster EU integration, and anti-corruption measures likely amused their Bosniak partners. They’ve never had an easier negotiation with RS parties who, consumed by hatred for Dodik, are willing to sign anything just to harm him.
This makes the “Brussels supervision” scenario completely acceptable to the RS opposition.
Despite their enthusiasm, what concerns London, Brussels, and Berlin is the lack of political capacity within the RS opposition. Current trends do not favor either SDS or PDP, and their current political strategy offers little hope for the 2026 elections. These parties have pinned all their hopes on Dodik’s arrest, a collapse of the ruling coalition in RS, where they would appear as a “necessary evil”.
This explains why they, like political Sarajevo, are equally bothered by BiH’s dysfunctionality and the absence of state institutions within Republika Srpska.
The opposition is ready to make every concession, to ensure smooth decision-making from the Council of Ministers to both chambers of Parliament, to pass all EU-requested laws – if only it means seeing Dodik and SNSD collapse. And since this has not yet happened, their frustration is becoming more visible, and their pro-Bosnian stance more prominent.
That’s why they don’t mind if this scenario brings a new wave of unitarization under the EU integration banner and further diminishes Republika Srpska’s autonomy. The RS opposition has already guaranteed loyalty to BiH and the Central Election Commission if elections in RS in 2026 are held under the Serb electoral law and overseen by the RS Election Commission.
In the end, regardless of how much London, Berlin, and Brussels plot and dream of new supervisory roles in BiH—aimed at further reducing the position of the Serb people – this scenario has serious flaws.
First, they’ve too easily written off the position of the US, a country so deeply embedded in BiH’s decision-making over the past three decades that it’s hard to imagine it would abandon all that to satisfy the political interests of London, Brussels and Berlin.
The scenario also ignores the role of the UN Security Council, as well as Russia and China—both permanent members—who are being too lightly dismissed despite their influence in the Western Balkans.
It disregards the will of the Serb people, who already appear poised to politically punish the pro-Bosnian RS opposition in upcoming elections.
They’ve also hit a “hard nut” in terms of Croatian interests, still lacking a solution that satisfies HDZ without sinking the Bosniak ruling parties.
And most importantly, they fail to consider that Republika Srpska may already have a ready response to this scenario—to the maneuvering of London, Brussels, and Berlin, and the betrayal of the RS opposition. A response they surely won’t like.
Source: srna.rs
